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DE RUEHNO #0312/01 2461628
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021628Z SEP 08
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2204
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0001
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 3280
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000312

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [PGOV](#) [MOPS](#) [KV](#)
SUBJECT: NATO: EULEX CHIEF SEEKING KOSOVO-WIDE DEPLOYMENT
AND PRAGMATIC COOPERATION WITH KFOR

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Walter S. Reid for reason
s 1.4 (b and d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon told NATO Permanent Representatives on 2 September that EULEX intends to deploy throughout Kosovo in accordance with the UNMIK-EULEX transition schedule, but is working to get a buy-in from Serbia to move into northern Kosovo. De Kermabon said he was looking for pragmatic, tactical coordination with KFOR and assured the Allies that he understood KFOR was the third responder for primary security and that he was working to ensure there would be no policing gap. De Kermabon assessed Kosovo to be stable but fragile and said EULEX was working to establish a rapport with Kosovars and with Belgrade. END SUMMARY

EULEX SEEKING TO ENGAGE SERBS

¶2. (C) The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head of Mission Yves de Kermabon on 2 September briefed NATO Perm Reps on the EULEX mission. De Kermabon assessed Kosovo as stable but fragile and expressed concern about the potential for provocations, economic unrest, or organized crime to aggravate the situation. He said EULEX needs a working relationship with Kosovar Albanians and Serbs but also some cooperation from Belgrade to deploy throughout Kosovo. De Kermabon expressed optimism that he was gaining Kosovar Serb buy-in by establishing contacts and doing local media interviews in order to allay suspicions about EULEX and hoped to go to northern Kosovo soon. He was also hopeful that, with a pro-EU Serbian government and some signs of change in Belgrade, Serbia would come around to accepting an EULEX presence in northern Kosovo but said this would require more EU and EULEX engagement with Belgrade beginning this month.

EULEX INTENDS TO DEPLOY THROUGHOUT KOSOVO

¶3. (C) De Kermabon said his end-state goal is for EULEX to be deployed and working throughout Kosovo. EULEX will begin a phased deployment of groups of 60-100 personnel after 20 September and expects to reach initial operating capability by late November or early December. EULEX would then be ready to take over leadership from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and would reach full operating capability Kosovo-wide at some point afterward. De Kermabon said work remains to be

done to define the EULEX-UNMIK division of labor, especially regarding the EULEX presence in northern Kosovo, and to obtain UN privileges and immunities (P/Is) for EULEX personnel.

LOOKING FOR NOD FROM BELGRADE

14. (C) In response to Ambassador Volker's and other Allies' requests for a more detailed UNMIK-EULEX transition timeline and EULEX's plans for moving into northern Kosovo, de Kermabon said that his intent was to deploy EULEX throughout Kosovo as quickly as possible but that developments on the ground could cause delays. De Kermabon said that EULEX needs some signals from Belgrade because it cannot move into the north by force. He was working to remove Serbian objections by arguing that EULEX was a technical mission and had already exchanged some technical data with Belgrade on these grounds.

In response to a Norwegian query, de Kermabon stated that EULEX personnel would probably work initially in the field in the north under UNMIK authority and then transition over time directly under EULEX.

15. (C) De Kermabon responded to a Czech request for clarity on EULEX's role by stating that, unlike UNMIK, EULEX would focus on mentoring Kosovar authorities, although it will have some executive authority to remove officials. EULEX will perform institution-building in the police, customs, and justice sectors and considers its major challenge to be in restoring Kosovar confidence in the justice system.

KFOR IS THIRD RESPONDER; NO POLICING GAPS

16. (C) De Kermabon stressed the need for "pragmatic" KFOR-EULEX coordination in the field and did not raise the lack of a formal cooperation agreement. He said that, as former KFOR commander, he was committed to the idea that KFOR was the third responder for primary security. He did not foresee any security gap in the transition that could force KFOR to assume policing duties because UNMIK would stay in place and not downsize until EULEX was ready to take the lead. Ambassador Volker welcomed de Kermabon's assurances that EULEX would deploy throughout Kosovo, KFOR would remain the third responder, and that there would be no security gap.

17. (C) The Turkish Perm Rep said he was pleased with the idea of pragmatic KFOR-EULEX cooperation on the ground, something required by NATO's Comprehensive Approach. The British Perm Rep added that it would be important for NATO to agree to a revision of KFOR's Operations Plan (OPLAN) to establish a clear KFOR-EULEX relationship. France noted that getting NATO-EU cooperation right was important and a priority of the French EU Presidency, and Norway called for a NATO-EU coordination mechanism at the highest levels. The SYG closed in saying de Kermabon's visit was itself an important contribution to NATO-EU relations.

VOLKER